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PROBLEMS IN TESTING DIGITAL PROTECTIVE RELAY FOR IMMUNITY TO 
INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTIVE ELECTROMAGNETIC IMPACTS. CONTINUATION 
OF THE THEME 
 
The article is the continuation of the theme highlighted in the previous article with same title. The new article evaluates the re-
sults of digital protective relays (DPR) testing for immunity to the E1 component of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) 
and to Intentional Electromagnetic Interferences (IEMI) impacts, conducted by some independent American organizations; dis-
cusses the features of relay protection devices as well as clarifies and supplements the procedure for testing these devices. Due to 
methodology errors during the DPR tests conducted by mentioned organizations earlier, they cannot be considered as satisfactory 
and their results as meaningful. At the moment there are no reliable data on the level of DPR immunity to IDEI, which suggests 
that the test should be conducted further. References 7, figures 6. 
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Статья является продолжением темы, рассмотренной в предыдущей статье с таким же названием. В новой ста-
тье оцениваются результаты испытаний микропроцессорных устройств релейной защиты (МУРЗ) на устойчивость 
к компоненту E1 электромагнитного импульса высотного ядерного взрыва (ЭМИ ЯВ) и к преднамеренным дистанци-
онным электромагнитным воздействиям (ПДДВ), приводимые некоторыми независимыми американскими организа-
циями; обсуждаются особенности методики их испытаний. Показано, что из-за ошибок в методологии испытаний, 
результаты, полученные упомянутыми выше организациями нельзя считать достоверными. В настоящее время нет 
никаких надежных данных об уровне устойчивости МУРЗ к ПДДВ, что указывает на необходимость проведения до-
полнительных испытаний. Библ. 7, рис. 6. 
Ключевые слова: электромагнитный импульс высотного ядерного взрыва, преднамеренные деструктивные электро-
магнитные воздействия, микропроцессорные устройства релейной защиты. 
 
Introduction. In my previous article on this theme 
[1] I presented a substantial analysis of the regulatory 
documents related to the problem of Intentional Destruc-
tive Electromagnetic Impacts (IDEI) on Digital Protective 
Relays (DPR). I justified the choice of test methods, ar-
ticulated the requirements to parameters of test impacts 
and included a review of technical aids that facilitate 
these tests. However, my communication with technical 
staff responsible for these tests, which is provided in [1], 
was not enough for the correct planning and conduction 
of experiments. Analysis of findings of earlier tests re-
vealed that the methods used for trials, criteria of opera-
tion quality and parameters of testing impact are rarely 
selected correctly resulting in the fact that the findings of 
the tests do not allow making an unambiguous judgment 
about DPR's resistance to IDEI. This requires conducting 
further investigations of the issue and developing addi-
tional recommendations. 
Use of performance criterion during the electro-
magnetic compatibility (EMC) test of electronic 
equipment. The response of an object under test (OUT) 
to electromagnetic impacts (EI) can be variable. For ex-
ample, the OUT can be fully inoperative due to a break-
down of internal electronic components, while on the 
other hand it can be temporarily non-operative only dur-
ing the impact of either the impulse or electromagnetic 
field. Another possibility is a short-term fault in the soft-
ware operation as affected by the impulse voltage sup-
plied to the OUT, which may require (or not) from the 
operator to reset the internal program of the OUT. There 
are many types of responses of the OUT to EI. The ac-
ceptable response of this type of OUT to electromagnetic 
impact under some type of trial is called «performance 
criterion» (PC). The performance criterion is an extremely 
important indicator in the tests for EMC. When properly 
selected it allows reaching a conclusion whether a specific 
device has passed the specific test or not. However, the 
EMC standards do not contain (and they are unlikely to 
contain) the methods of the correct selection of these cri-
teria. As a rule everything is limited by a sentence like: 
«Selection of the strictness degree for performance crite-
rion is performed by people who develop and approve 
performance specifications and technical conditions» and 
a chart from which a specific PC can be selected out of 
3-4 criterions offered by the specific standard. This is 
obvious, since the correct choice depends on the specific 
type of OUT and specific modes and conditions of its 
operation. Moreover, a different PC can be selected for 
the same type of OUT depending on its operation mode, 
connection diagram, purpose for use, working environ-
ment, etc. Thus, the understanding of specific features of 
each single OUT is very important, since the choice of 
one or another performance criterion allows making a 
decision of whether this specific OUT fits (or doesn't fit) 
specific working environment based on the trial results.  
Features of performance criterion during the 
IDEI immunity test of DPR. The North American Elec-
tric Reliability Council (NERC) has established a list of 
equipment, which needs to be tested for immunity to High 
Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) upon the request 
of special commission: Congressional «Commission to 
Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromag-
netic Pulse (EMP) Attack». The list includes, in particu-
lar, digital protective relays (DPR) and SCADA (Supervi-
sory Control and Data Acquisition – a general name for 
software and hardware measures of different types, which 
ensure real-time data collection from numerous detectors, 
processing, archiving, displaying and transferring infor-
mation about objects under monitoring as well as the 
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transfer of operator commands to remote sites – founda-
tion of Substation Control System – SCS) system. 
Metatech Company conducted tests of SEL-311L DPR 
(Differential Line Protection) and SEL-2032 controller of 
SCADA system (fig. 1) under a shortening test program. 
The test was performed only for immunity to the E1 com-
ponent of HEMP. The results of these tests are presented 
in the Meta-R-320 [2] report. As indicated in the report 
evaluation of the correctness of operation and lack of 
damages after each test was selected as PC in the DPR 
and SCADA controller tests. During the tests short-time 
(5/50 nsec) high-voltage impulses with an amplitude of up 
to 8 kV were applied to different terminals of devices.  
 
Fig. 1. SEL-311L DPR and SEL-2032 controller for SCADA 
system produced by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories 
(USA) subject to testing for HEMP immunity 
 
The report also mentioned that application of im-
pulses with an amplitude of up to 3.2 kV to the serial port 
resulted in spontaneous DPR switch-off, but then it re-
turned to normal operation mode. Some other ports (e.g., 
IRIG – Inter-Range Instrumentation Group time code – 
time synchronization port) were damaged at as low as 
600V. The Ethernet communication module of the 
SCADA controller was damaged at 1.2 kV. The report 
also suggests that the record of oscillographic tests of 
current and voltage rates supplied to the relay's terminals 
were selected as one of the additional parameters of PC. It 
is mentioned in the report that abnormalities in the record 
were not revealed during testing. 
Criticism of the DPR testing method used in [2] 
1. I think it is incorrect to use the PC based on the DPR 
damages check after it is subjected to interference. This 
does not allow making a definite conclusion about the 
immunity of DPR to this interference. This is due to the 
fact that DPR possesses several specific features reviewed 
in [3, 4] as compared to the SCADA system. With all the 
importance and responsibility of the SCADA system it is 
designed in first and foremost for automatic collection, 
processing and displaying information. Despite the fact 
that the system includes the so-called Remote Terminal 
Units (RTU) – remotely controlled actuating units, they 
cannot work under the automatic mode and are only in-
tended for performance of operator commands from a 
remote control center. The majority of modern substations 
work in the automatic mode without any operator. Manual 
control of breaker status on these substations (i.e., literally 
control of power system configuration) is performed by 
an operator sitting in a remote control center through the 
SCADA system, which is susceptible to IDEI impacts. 
This is why, in case of IDEI impact, the remote control of 
a substation from the control center will likely be lost and 
the configuration of the power system will only be deter-
mined by the relay protection system – the only system 
that can automatically control the breaker status. At the 
same time, the DPRs, which comprise the foundation of 
the modern relay protection, are constantly sharing infor-
mation and commands in the automatic mode via com-
munication channels susceptible to IDEI (unlike the 
SCADA system, where critical control commands are 
delivered to breakers spearheaded by a dispatcher). In the 
event of incorrect actions of automatic operating relay 
protection, where the dispatcher cannot intrude, such as 
unnecessary operation subject to IDEI impact, the electric 
power system and then the whole energy system can fully 
collapse. This is one of the reasons why the digital protec-
tion relay should be tested for IDEI impacts during op-
eration and not be checked for damages after the impact 
of interference. 
2. There are different paths of the entering of electro-
magnetic interference (represented by impulses supplied 
to protected terminals) and high-voltage electromagnetic 
waves (which enter directly into internal high-sensitive 
electronic components or through unprotected termi-
nals/ports of electronic units as well as though multiple 
cables connected to DPR and functioning as antennas 
absorbing electromagnetic energy) to DPR. Moreover, the 
IDEI is not limited to HEMP only. It includes directed 
ultra-broadband high-frequency emissions of special 
sources with power ratings of several Gigawatts and is 
intended for remote destruction of electronic equipment 
[4]. Unfortunately, the danger is caused not only by spe-
cial purpose devices intended for affecting electronic 
equipment, but also by emissions of ordinary powerful 
radars. For instance, in 1999 there was an officially regis-
tered event of devastating failure of the SCADA system at 
the San Diego County Water Authority Company, which 
supplies water to San Diego, CA. The reason for the fail-
ure was an emission of marine radar located 25 miles 
away from the city. In 1980 a similar case was registered 
on a gas supply line located 1.5 km away from Den 
Helder port in the Netherlands. The latter case of SCADA 
system damage by a marine radar resulted in a powerful 
gas explosion. This is why testing of DPR immunity to 
IDEI should not be limited by applying high-voltage im-
pulses to certain terminals only. It should by accompanied 
by exposure of the OUT to electromagnetic emission from 
a directional antenna as stipulated by corresponding stan-
dards [1]. 
3. It should be taken into consideration that a case of 
HEMP it will affect not only high-sensitive electronic 
equipment (DPR, hardware of SCADA system), but also 
power facilities of energy systems, such as linear insula-
tors, transformers and power generators. It should be 
noted that this equipment will be affected by not only the 
E1 component of HEMP (modeled during trials [2]) under 
these circumstances, but also by the other two compo-
nents, i.e., Е2 and Е3 [1]. Previous research [2] conducted 
in the Soviet Union and the USA shows that the affect of 
all components of HEMP can result in the damage of 
power high-voltage equipment, such as break down of 
linear insulators, saturation and burning of power trans-
formers, punctures of power generator insulation, etc. In 
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other words, the moment of impact of a powerful elec-
tromagnetic interference on DPR matches in time with the 
moment of changing of internal state of DPR elements, 
which is due to emerging of emergency rates of controlled 
current and voltage at its terminals. How will DPR behave 
under this mode? Will the IDEI affected relay protection 
be able to disconnect the saturating transformer or dam-
aged part of aerial line of punctured cable? Won't the 
common directional operation of different DPR be a cause 
of full disintegration and collapse of the energy system?  
The research conducted in [2] does not provide an-
swers to these questions. «We have produced designs so 
complicated that we cannot possibly anticipate all the 
possible interactions of the inevitable failures; we add 
safety devices that are deceived or avoided or defeated by 
hidden paths in the systems» – wrote the famous specialist 
on reliability and susceptibility of complex systems 
Charles Perrow [5]. Perrow calls this problem «incompre-
hensibility» since even the ordinary incident can trigger 
interactions, which are «not only unexpected, but also 
unpredictable for a certain critical period of time». In 
most accidents nobody could expect that certain «interac-
tion algorithms» will trigger others. Thus, nobody could 
predict what happened. This has a relation to modern 
rather complicated and branched relay protection system 
the behavior of which is difficult to predict under the 
IDEI impact. 
Analysis of the result of the second independent 
trial of the same type of DPR. Another test of the same 
type of DPR (by an odd coincidence) is reported in a 
promotional presentation of the producer of these devices 
– Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Company – SEL 
[6]. The presentation covers the results of testing of SEL-
311 DPR samples on the test-benches of US Army’s Pi-
catinny Arsenal in New Jersey for HEMP and electro-
magnetic impact (fig. 2).  
 
Fig. 2. SEL-311 DPR test for IDEI impact on Picatinny Arsenal 
test-benches in New Jersey [6] 
 
The promotional presentation suggests that all tests 
were successful. At the same time the deeper analysis of 
the material reveals several odd things. For instance, the 
advertisement depicted in fig. 3 suggests that SEL-311 
was tested at field strength varied from 25 to 1000 V/m 
whereas the military standard MIL-STD-461 requires 
only 50 V/m. 
The specialists of the renowned SEL Company 
demonstrate a rather odd ignorance in their report. The 
fact is that according to the MIL-STD-461 the units of 
measure of the field strength under IDEI impact are kilo-
volts, while they report volts and the figure «50» is pre-
sented as 50 kV/m instead of 50 V/m. 
 
Fig. 3. The text from the promotional brochure 
of SEL Company [6] 
 
The bar diagram illustrated in fig. 4 is even odder. It 
shows that in reality the field strength of 1000 V/m was 
implemented for testing at 1000-1500 MHz frequencies, 
while at another of frequencies it was almost two times 
lower. Another thing is that the dependence of amplitude 
on the frequency does not correspond to MIL-STD-461. 
 
Fig. 4. Parameters of electromagnetic emission during SEL-311 
DPR testing [6] 
 
It is obvious from the diagram that the levels of field 
strength are limited by the beginning of the instability of 
relay functioning (yellow areas on the tops of the bars). In 
other words the diagram shows the area of steady opera-
tion of a separately installed (outside the relay protection 
system) SEL terminal. This implies that the relay doesn't 
allow for steady operation outside the area of values rep-
resented in this diagram with its extremely low levels of 
electromagnetic field strength. 
When comparing it with the above mentioned MIL-
STD-416 (fig. 5), you can see that the applied parameters 
of testing impacts are far away from the requirements of 
this standard. Considering the oddness of parameters se-
lection to test SEL-311 immunity to IDEI who can take 
seriously about the manufacturer's statement that these 
relays are resistant to IDEI? 
Another problem is the selection of a single DPR 
terminal as an OUT. As a rule, these terminals are manu-
factured in metal housings, which effectively weaken the 
electromagnetic emission. This is why the test results for 
electromagnetic impact on this single terminal are ex-
pected to be positive. In the field conditions DPR is 
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entangled by multiple cables acting as antennas and ab-
sorbing electromagnetic energy delivering it to the inter-
nal elements of DPR; multiple terminals of DPR are inter-
connected through corresponding communication instru-
ments susceptible to IDEI impact. Thus, the test should be 
performed on the whole relay protection system while in 
operation rather than its single terminal. 
An example of the correct approach to testing of 
complex systems to which relay protection undoubtedly 
belongs is represented by SCADA system testing de-
scribed in [7] (fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 5. A diagram from page 138 of MIL-STD-416F to compare 
with the diagram illustrated in fig. 1 (1 ns corresponds 
to a frequency of 1 GHz) 
 
Fig. 6. Testing of SCADA system for immunity to HEMP [7]. 
An antenna system of EMI simulator is seen above. The 
elements of SCADA system are located in separate boxes and 
connected with each other via a standard communication system 
 
Thus, the results of two independent tests of the 
DPR conducted by different manufacturers do not allow 
coming to any conclusion on its real immunity to IDEI. 
So, who would need these results?  
Conclusions and recommendations: 
1. Due to methodology errors during the DPR tests 
conducted by independent organizations earlier, they can-
not be considered as satisfactory and their results as 
meaningful. At the moment there are no reliable data on 
the level of DPR immunity to IDEI, which suggests that 
the test should be conducted further. 
 
2. The kinds and modes of DPR tests should be fully per-
formed and correspond to the standards as described in [1]. 
3. The PC should be represented by a criterion, which 
allows for controlling DPR operation under normal and 
emergency modes of the object under protection when it 
is affected by an electromagnetic interference instead of a 
criterion that is based exclusively on checking the DPR 
condition when the impact of interference is over. 
4. Testing should be performed on both the separate 
unit of DPR and the full relay protection system consist-
ing of several DPR units connected with each other by 
several meters of cables via a corresponding communica-
tion device. At the same time electromagnetic energy 
should affect the relay protection system, while impulse 
tests for applied voltage should be performed on both 
separate DPR units/communication devices and several 
DPR units connected together with communication de-
vices simultaneously. 
5. During the test several steps of test impulse ampli-
tude and electric field strength should be selected: from 
minimum to maximum value within the ranges described 
in the standards. The obtained data can be used during the 
evaluation of immunity of the DPR installed in specific 
cabinets and buildings, which possess a certain index of 
electric field weakening. They can also be used in the 
process of elaboration of requirements to further weaken-
ing of this field, if it is revealed that the current conditions 
do not ensure the required immunity of DPR to IDEI. 
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